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Abstract. Intellectual property protection (IPP) of hard-
ware designs is the most important requirement for many 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) intellectual prop-
erty (IP) vendors. Digital watermarking has become 
an innovative technology for IPP in recent years. Existing 
watermarking techniques have successfully embedded 
watermark into IP cores. However, many of these tech-
niques share two specific weaknesses: 1) They have extra 
overhead, and are likely to degrade performance of design; 
2)	 vulnerability to removing attacks. We propose a novel 
watermarking technique to watermark FPGA bitfile for 
addressing these weaknesses. Experimental results and 
analysis show that the proposed technique incurs zero 
overhead and it is robust against removing attacks. 
Keywords 
Field programmable gate array (FPGA), intellectual 
property protection (IPP), watermarking. 
1. Introduction 
The advance in semiconductor processing technology 
has led to rapid increase in integrated-circuit (IC) design 
complexity. Reuse-based design methodology has pre-
vailed in IC design field. Intellectual property (IP) reuse 
can reduce product costs, shorten design cycles and 
decrease the design risk. Nowadays, reusable IP cores have 
become the basic units of system design. IP cores are 
widely exchanged and are being sold as an independent 
design. Most of reusable IP cores require a lot of time and 
effort to be implemented and verified by IP vendors, but 
these IP cores can be very easily copied or modified. 
Therefore, IP vendors are eager in keeping their products 
protective from unauthorized using and tampering. Addi-
tionally, users also expect that purchased IP core is correct 
and legitimate. How to protect reusable IP cores effectively 
has become a serious problem and therefore an increasing 
amount of attention has been paid. 
Various kinds of IPP techniques, such as watermark-
ing, fingerprinting, are proposed by researchers both from 
the industry and the academia. Among these techniques, 
watermarking is the most extensive mechanism imple-
mented in the abstraction levels of IC design flow to pro-
tect IP cores from illegal reuse.  
The concept of digital watermarking FPGA is first 
proposed by Lach et al. [5]. The basic idea is that the 
owner's digital signature is embedded into unused (look-up 
tables) LUTs in unused slices (i.e. non-functional slices) at 
physical layout level. The constrained Configurable Logic 
Blocks (CLBs) are then incorporated into the design with 
unused interconnect and “don’t care” inputs of neighboring 
CLBs, which then consecutively further hides the signature. 
Since watermark is randomly embedded into unused slices, 
this method inevitably generates extra area overhead, and 
neighboring CLB “don’t care” inputs that are used to con-
nect watermarked slices will incur timing overhead to 
a certain extent. The watermark is vulnerable to (partial) 
removing attacks. Later, the author improved the robust-
ness to a certain extent using multiple small watermarks [6]. 
The experimental results report resource overhead varying 
from 0.05% to 33.86% and timing overhead from –25.93% 
to 11.95%. Additionally, no attention has been paid on 
probability of coincidence (Pc) and power overhead due to 
watermarking. Kahng et al. [7] first proposed the notion of 
constraint-based watermarking. The idea is as follows. 
Firstly, in order to make use of a number of satisfiability 
(SAT) issues during IP development process, the constraint 
generator transforms embedded watermark into a set of 
additional constraints, then limits the solution of the SAT 
problem into a smaller space when they are added to the 
constraints. Finally, a unique design is generated with 
a watermark. The constraint-based method has been used to 
develop many watermarking schemes for IPP at different 
abstraction levels of VLSI/FPGA design flow [8-13]. How-
ever, additional constraints of these methods if imposed 
would consecutively bring extra overhead to the design. 
A zero-cost method of watermark embedding was proposed 
by Adarsh K. Jain et al. [15]. The method mainly modifies 
the non-critical path delay between non-synchronous regis-
ters to embed the watermark in the placement and routing 
stage. The proposed watermark scheme doesn’t need addi-
tional hardware resources. Therefore its area and delay 
overheads are almost zero. However, because the changing 
part is the path delay, the performance of design would be 
affected to a certain extent. Additionally, authorship veri-
fiability is a fatal weakness, since the watermark cannot be 
verified at lower abstract level of IC design flow. The  
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watermarking technique cannot be applicable if lack of 
traceability. D. Ziener et al. [16] introduce a method to 
identify IP cores in an FPGA by analyzing the content of 
LUTs. This technique can be used to identify registered 
cores for IP protection against unlicensed usage, but the 
extraction of content of the LUT from a configuration bit-
file excessively depends on FPGA device and FPGA ven-
dor. M. Schmid et al. proposed a netlist-level IPP scheme 
[17], which modifies LUTs of netlist-level and converts 
functional LUTs to LUT-based RAMs or shift registers to 
prevent deletion due to optimization. But the overhead 
incurred is large. After an analysis of the public domain 
core: Cordic, the scheme showed resource overhead ranged 
from 4.97% to 52.57% and timing overhead from 32.53% 
to 78.76% at a fixed interconnection length of 4. Finite 
state machine (FSM) watermarking [10], [14], [21] is 
another kind of method that can be applied to FPGA design 
for IPP. FSM watermarking embeds the signature at behav-
ioral/RT level of design abstraction. Although ownership 
can be authenticated directly, it is challenging to keep the 
overhead of watermarked design low [1] and it does not 
permit ownership to be detected directly after IP cores have 
been packaged except the literature [1]. 
Lots of watermarking techniques have been proposed. 
However, there are two key weaknesses for existing IP 
watermarking techniques. Firstly, many of these techniques 
incur extra overhead (area, timing or power overhead). 
However, area, timing and power are key optimization 
goals of FPGA design [2]. Watermarking hardware IP 
demands that the watermarked IP maintains the correctness 
of functionality while keeping the performance and cost 
overheads as low as possible [3]. Secondly, existing water-
marking techniques can successfully embed watermark into 
IP cores, but they have the vulnerability to watermark 
removal. 
In this paper, we propose a novel watermark tech-
nique that can achieve the goals of zero-overhead without 
affecting the function and performance of design. Addition-
ally, it has the ability of resisting to removing attacks. 
There are many functional slices containing lots of LUTs 
that have not been used effectively. This kind of LUTs, we 
call as “ILUT”. Firstly, we acquire a set of ILUT at post 
layout of FPGA design flow. Secondly, the locations where 
encrypted watermarks need to be embedded into are deter-
mined by a pseudo random sequence. Thirdly, Encrypted 
watermark is grouped using Content-Copy Method (CCM), 
and then inserted into ILUTs. Finally, an interconnection 
method applies to interconnection between embedded 
watermark LUTs and the adjacent functional LUTs to 
disguise the embedded watermark.  
Our watermarking method has several merits in com-
parison with related watermarking techniques: 1) zero-
overhead: zero area, timing and power overhead; 2) having 
no impact on the function and performance of design; 
3) The watermark is grouped by using CCM, which makes 
the content feature of the watermarked ILUTs be identical 
to functional LUTs. Hence, the embedded watermark is 
very difficult to be detected and removed; 4) the proposed 
watermarking scheme has a very low probability of coinci-
dence and hence provides strong proof of authorship. 
5) The position of the watermark inserted is determined by 
a pseudo-random sequence, so watermarking verification 
process is executed easily; 6) the proposed watermarking 
technique is zero-overhead, so it can blend well with exist-
ing watermarking techniques for the IPP to augment the 
ownership detectability and traceability. 
2. The Proposed Watermarking 
Technique 
2.1 Watermarking Principle 
The CLBs are the main logic resources of FPGA for 
implementing sequential as well as combinational circuits. 
A CLB element in Virtex-5 FPGAs contains a pair of slices. 
Each slice contains four 64×1 LUTs (or 32×2 LUTs) and 
four flip-flops. The function generators are implemented as 
six-input LUTs. There are six independent inputs and two 
independent outputs for each of the four function genera-
tors in a slice. The function generators can implement any 
arbitrarily defined six-input Boolean function [18]. In other 
words, you can configure the LUTs to implement any 
Boolean function. 
The logic functions that the slices implemented are 
classified into three categories after placement and route 
phase: 1) Combinational with register. The slices are used 
to implement the combinational logic and sequential logic. 
2) Register only. These slices are only used to implement 
sequential logic. Flip-flops of these slices are used, but the 
LUTs are not used. 3) Combinational with no register. 
These slices are only used to implement the combinational 
logic. The number and utilization factor of the three kinds 
of slices can be obtained from Device Utilization Summary 
(Xilinx FPGAs) or Fitter Resource Usage Summary (Altera 
FPGAs). All of the three kinds of already used slices may 
contain some LUTs, which have not been used effectively. 
We called this kind of LUTs as “ILUTs”. ILUTs have a 
key feature: they consist in functional slices and actually 
have been used by FPGA designs, except that these ILUTs 
have no function. All the cells content of a 6-input ILUT 
are set to ‘1’. These ILUTs have been reported "used" in 
the Place and Route Report, which is generated by Xilinx 
ISE tool. 
The reasons why ILUTs exist in FPGA designs are re-
lated to placement and routing. Simply adding intercon-
nects to achieve high LUT utilization is not always area 
efficient [19]. Since interconnection resources consume 
most of the area on FPGA devices (often 80-90%), we can 
achieve more area efficient designs by allowing some LUT 
to go unused — allowing us to use the domain resource, 
interconnect, more efficiently [19]. Therefore, there are lots 
of ILUTs in FPGA designs. The experimental result (see 
Tab. 1) also shows that the number of ILUT is large. 
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After placement and routing, we acquire the set of 
ILUTs, and then we employ the editing tool FPGA Editor 
to configure ILUTs to embed the watermark. A 6-input 
ILUT can be considered as a RAM and can store up to 
64bit digital marks, with a 6-bit inputs specifying the ad-
dress of the bit to read from the stored mark. For instance, 
assume a 4-bit marks w = “0110”, which can be imple-
mented with a Boolean function F (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, 
A6) = A1 or A2. A1 and A2 are inputs that are randomly 
selected from A1~A6. F can be configured into an ILUT by 
the FPGA Editor; the output of the ILUT is w. Fig. 1 shows 
that the watermark w is embedded into an ILUT. 
 
Fig. 1. An example of implementing a function F in an ILUT. 
2.2 The Proposed Content-Copy Method 
All LUTs of an FPGA have n inputs. There are lots of 
m used input LUTs in B, m < n. m-input LUTs must be 
mapped into n-input LUTs. If one input is unused, only half 
of the memory is needed to store the function and the re-
maining space must be filled [16]. This depends on FPGA 
architecture. If the output of an ILUT is routed to the input 
of an n-input LUT, the content of an (n-1)-input LUT is 
copied into the unused region of the n-input LUT, no mat-
ter the unused input is applied one or zero, the output of the 
LUT is correct (This feature of FPGA is called CCM). 
Therefore, the functionality of LUT remains unchanged. 
 
Fig. 2. An example of LUT’s function remaining stable with 
interconnection method. 
Give a simple example, a 6-input LUT is shown in 
Fig. 2, suppose the function of ILUT is F (A1, A2, A3, A4, 
A5, A6) = ~ (A1 XOR A2) (A1 and A2 are the used inputs 
of the LUT, and A3~A6 are “don’t care” inputs). The out-
put of an ILUT is connected to A4 (indicated by red lines). 
Given A1 is 0 and A2 is 1, if A4 is 0 (1), then the address  
of the LUT cell is 000010 (001010), and the corresponding 
output of the LUT is 0 (0). i.e., no matter A4 is 0 or 1, the 
output of the LUT is 0, which is correct. 
In order to improve the robustness of the proposed 
watermarking technique, we applied the CCM to group the 
watermark and then embedded the grouped watermark into 
ILUTs. After applying the CCM, the content features of the 
watermarked ILUTs are the same as functional LUTs. 
The implement of CCM is: for an n-input ILUT, we 
randomly selected m inputs from n to implement function 
as the watermark (m  n).  
After the watermark is embedded into the ILUTs, 
watermarked functional slices have connected with other 
slices, but there is no physical net connection between the 
watermarked ILUTs and the original design, an attacker 
may use brute-force search to find the non-interconnected 
LUTs with no input and output, and then empty the content 
of these LUTs. The watermark would be removed. 
An interconnection method is applied to the watermarked 
ILUTs to disguise the embedded watermark. Besides, the 
interconnection method can maintain the correctness of 
designs. Therefore, our watermarking method can guaran-
tee the security of the embedded watermark without affect-
ing the function of designs. Meanwhile, experimental 
results show that the proposed interconnection method 
incurs zero timing overhead on original FPGA design. 
The interconnection method is that the inputs of the 
watermarked ILUTs are taps off of inputs or outputs of 
adjacent functional LUTs, and then the outputs are routed 
to neighboring functional LUTs “don’t care” inputs or the 
watermarked ILUTs “don’t care” inputs. 
2.3 The Overview of the Proposed 
Watermarking Technique 
In this paper, we employ mathematically precise ap-
proaches [17], [20] to describe our watermarking technique.  
The proposed watermarking technique for FPGA 
designs consists of watermark preparation algorithm PB, 
watermark embedding algorithm EB, and watermark 
verification algorithm VB. 
Watermark preparation algorithm PB (WB = PB (K, S)) 
generates a watermark WB according to a key K and the 
signature S. A key K is a sequence of binary bits  
(K= {0, 1}n). The watermark is embedded into the design IB 
by the embedding algorithm EB (‘IB = EB (IB, WB, L, R)) 
creating a watermarked design ‘IB. R is the position where 
watermark will be embedded in. L = Ext (IB), L is extracted 
from the design IB. The verification algorithm VB (‘IB, WB) 
receives a watermark WB and a design ‘IB as inputs. It is 
capable of efficiently determining whether WB is contained 
in ‘IB. If WB is contained in the design ‘IB, the output of the 
verification algorithm is VB (‘IB, WB) = true, and if it is not, 
VB (‘IB, WB) = false. 
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Define the set of ILUT L= {ILUT1, ILUT2,…, ILUTn} 
(n = 0, 1,…). Each ILUT can accommodate up to 64bit 
watermark. The hashed and encrypted signature WB is 
divided into groups: {wB1, wB2,…,wBl}, wBi∈WB, i = 0,1,…,l. 
LenBi representing the length of wBi, is randomly selected 
from the set of {4, 8, 16, 32, 64}. wBi was embedded in the 
specific location where determined by the pseudo-random 
number sequence R (R = Random (WB) = {rB1, rB2,…, rBl}. 
We describe our watermarking algorithm in the 
flowchart shown in Fig. 3. Detailed description of our 
watermarking algorithm is presented in section 2.4 and 2.5. 
	
Fig. 3. The overview of the proposed watermarking method. 
2.4 Watermark Preparation and Embedding 
In order to ensure the safety of our signature, it needs 
to be hashed and then encrypted. First we employ a secure 
hash algorithm (e.g. SHA1) to generate a hash value with 
non-linear functions from a signature, which is denoted by 
h = H(S), S denotes the signature. It is computationally 
infeasible to find another signature that hashes to the same 
value. The next step is to encrypt the hashed value with the 
key Key1. This is implemented by a public key algorithm, 
e.g. RSA, which is an asymmetrical cryptographically 
method. To embed the watermark, we need to get informa-
tion about the content of the watermark and the positions 
where the watermark will be embedded. The content of the 
watermark is generated by WB = Enckey1 (h). WB is divided 
into groups {wB1, wB2,…,wBl} by randomly selecting the 
length of wBi from the set of {4, 8, 16, 32, 64}, the length 
of wBi  is denoted by LenBi = length(wBi). We get the infor-
mation about the positions of the watermark from a pseudo 
random sequence, which is generated by a pseudo random 
generator, e.g. RC4 (WB as the seed). The pseudo random 
sequence is denoted by R = Random (WB) = {rB1, 
rB2,…,rBl }. The preparation and embedding process of the 
watermark is detailed in Fig. 4. 
	
Fig. 4. The flow of watermark preparation and watermark 
embedding. 
The watermark preparation and embedding algorithm 
are shown as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watermark preparation is performed in steps 1 - 3. 
CCM is applied to the watermarked ILUTs in step 4. The 
locations of the watermark are generated in step 5. The set 
of ILUTs can be extracted from the design IB in step 6. 
Watermark embedding is then performed from step 7 - 11. 
2.5 Watermark Verification 
When the IP vendors suspect that their IP has been in-
fringed, they can apply for a neutral third-party organiza-
tion to extract the watermark from the IP core using the 
following algorithm, and then the ownership of the IP core 
will be easily verified. The process of watermark verifica-
tion is the inverse of watermark embedding. 
3. Experimental Results 
The proposed technique has been implemented on 
Xilinx Virtex XC5LX50t-3ff1136 FPGA. The tested IP 
cores come from IWLS 2005 benchmarks [4]. The experi-
mental results show that the proposed watermarking tech-
nique has zero overhead and very low Pc. 
1. Provide the signature S; 
2. h = H(S); 
3. WB = Enckey1 (h); 
4. Divide WB into groups {wB1, wB2,…, wBl};//CCM 
5. R = Random (WB); // R = {rB1, rB2,…,rBl } 
6. L = Ext (IB); // L = {ILUT1, ILUT2,…, ILUTn} 
7. for (i = 0; i < Bl; i ++) { 
8.     Build logic Functions FBi according to wBi; 
9.     Configure FBi into an ILUT according to rBi; 
10.    Apply the interconnection method to connect   
the watermarked ILUTs with the original design; 
11. } 
12. The watermark Embedding is done; 
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3.1 Overhead Analysis 
Tab.1 shows that the number of ILUTs is very large 
for different IP cores. The length of the embedded water-
mark can go up to 64-bit for an ILUT. The watermark can 
be embedded into each ILUT. Hence, for any medium IP 
core it can accommodate a fairly large digital watermark. 
As shown in Tab. 2, resources overhead is denoted by 
the increased “Number of Slice LUTs”. ILUTs consist in 
functional slices and actually have been used in the FPGA 
design. Only these ILUTs have no function and have been 
reported "used" in the Place and Route Report, which is 
generated by Xilinx ISE tool. Since we embed marks into 
the ILUTs, our approach incurs zero area overhead. Time 
overhead is measured by the minimum period degradation. 
We use the Timing Analyzer (Xilinx tool) to analyze tim-
ing overhead. As shown in Tab. 3, minimum period is 
unchanged, so we claim that our method has zero timing 
overhead. This can be explained that we only change part 
of the net connection of adjacent functional LUTs and 
hence original design is changed slightly. Tab. 5-7 dedicate 
that the changes are inappreciable: only some of the “hold  
Cores aes_core vga_lcd pci_bridge32 ethernet des_perf 
#ILUTs 481 841 2240 1151 5752 
# watermark bits = #ILUTs*64 30784 53824 143360 73664 368128 
Tab. 1.  The number of ILUTs and corresponding watermark bits. 
 
N.S.L.: Number of Slice LUTs    W.M: Watermark 
Original 64bit W.M 256bit W.M 512bit W.M 1024bit W.M 2048bit W.M IP Core N.S.L. N.S.L. Overhead N.S.L. Overhead N.S.L. Overhead N.S.L. Overhead N.S.L. Overhead 
aes_core 564 564 0% 564 0% 564 0% 564 0% 564 0% 
vga_lcd 1,007 1,007 0% 1,007 0% 1,007 0% 1,007 0% 1,007 0% 
pci_bridge32 1,453 1,453 0% 1,453 0% 1,453 0% 1,453 0% 1,453 0% 
ethernet 2,914 2,914 0% 2,914 0% 2,914 0% 2,914 0% 2,914 0% 
des_perf 5,768 5,768 0% 5,768 0% 5,768 0% 5,768 0% 5,768 0% 
Tab. 2.  Effect of number of watermarks on resources (Slice LUTs). 
 
M.P.: Minimum Period 
Original 64bit W.M 256bit W.M 512bit W.M 1024bit W.M 2048bit W.M IP Core M.P(ns) M.P(ns) Overhead M.P(ns) Overhead M.P(ns) Overhead M.P(ns) Overhead M.P(ns ) Overhead 
aes_core 5.728 5.728 0% 5.728 0% 5.728 0% 5.728 0% 5.728 0% 
vga_lcd 3.747 3.747 0% 3.747 0% 3.747 0% 3.747 0% 3.747 0% 
pci_bridge32 5.576 5.576 0% 5.576 0% 5.576 0% 5.576 0% 5.576 0% 
ethernet 7.139 7.139 0% 7.139 0% 7.139 0% 7.139 0% 7.139 0% 
des_perf 2.605 2.605 0% 2.605 0% 2.605 0% 2.605 0% 2.605 0% 
Tab. 3.  Effect of number of watermarks on timing (Minimum Period). 
 
P.: Power 
Original 64bit W.M 256bit W.M 512bit W.M 1024bit W.M 2048bit W.M IP Core P. (mW) P. (mW) Overhead P. (mW) Overhead P. (mW) Overhead P. (mW) Overhead P. (mW) Overhead 
aes_core 505 505 0% 505 0% 505 0% 505 0% 505 0% 
vga_lcd 506 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 
pci_bridge32 506 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 
ethernet 15 15 0% 15 0% 15 0% 15 0% 15 0% 
des_perf 506 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 506 0% 
Tab. 4.  Effect of number of watermarks on power. 
 
Source text_in<48> text_in<49> text_in<50> text_in<51> text_in<72> text_in<73> text_in<74> text_in<75> 
Original 1.485 0.724 1.418 0.931 1.570 1.071 0.986 1.473 
1024bit W.M 1.486 0.725 1.419 0.932 1.571 1.072 0.987 1.474 
Tab. 5.  The change of hold to clock clk (IP core: aes_core). 
 
Source text_in<48> text_in<49> text_in<50> text_in<51> text_in<64> text_in<65> text_in<66> text_in<67> 
Original -0.237 0.586 -0.168 0.363 -0.207 0.639 -0.250 -0.209 
1024bit W.M -0.238 0.585 -0.169 0.362 -0.208 0.638 -0.251 -0.210 
Tab. 6. The change of setup to clock clk (IP core: aes_core) 
 
Destination text_out<34> text_out<44> text_out<45> text_out<50> text_out<51> text_out<70> text_out<71> text_out<102> text_out<103> 
Original 7.666 8.240 7.649 7.372 7.631 6.935 7.095 7.696 6.930 
1024bit W.M 7.675 8.241 7.650 7.382 7.632 6.936 7.096 7.697 6.931 
Tab. 7. The change of clock clk to pad (IP core: aes_core) 
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to clock clk” , “setup to clock clk” and “clock clk to pad” 
of clk in the design are changed due to the proposed inter-
connection method. 
As shown in Tab. 4, we use the XPower (Xilinx tool) 
to analyze the power overhead, which includes static power 
overhead and dynamic power overhead. In an SRAM-based 
FPGA, all of the cells are set to either 1 or 0 (all of the cells 
of un-watermarked ILUTs are set to 1, and the cells of 
watermarked ILUTs are set to watermark bit), even if they 
are unused. Therefore, the static power overhead ought to 
be negligible. There may be some dynamic power overhead 
due to the switching that wouldn't have occurred without 
the additional connections, but we conclude that the dy-
namic power overhead would be fairly small, since the 
result of XPower analysis for the power overhead is zero. 
3.2 False Positive Analysis 
To evaluate the proof of authorship provided by the 
proposed watermarking technique, the false positive rate 
must be convincingly low. Pc is the measure for false posi-
tive [10]. It is defined as the probability that a non-water-
mark design carrying the legitimate watermark. In our 
proposed scheme, Pc is the probability that a permutation P 
of un-watermarked LUTs carry the same watermark as the 
watermark WB by coincidence. Generally, we cannot com-
pute Pc exactly. Let S be the number of occupied slices in 
a non-watermark design. Each occupied slice contains 4 
LUTs, so the number of LUTs in the occupied slices is  
N = 4*S. M represents the number of LUTs (each LUT is 
an element of the groups {wB1, wB2,…,wBl } as a Li-bit out-
put, Li ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32, 64}) randomly selected from N. For 
our proposed scheme, the Pc can be analytically approxi-
mated by assuming that each selected LUT cell is equally 
probable to output a ‘0’ or a ‘1’. So p0 = p1 = 0.5, p0 (p1) is 
the probability that a selected cell outputs a ‘0’ (‘1’) bit. 
The probability of selecting M ordered LUTs from N candi- 
date LUTs is given by1/ MNP . Let n indicate the length of 
the watermark, 
1
M
i
i
n L

  .Thus the Pc in our proposed 
method is 
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where k is the number of bits that the selected M LUT cell 
output ‘0’. 
256, 512, 1024 or 2048-bit long watermark is embed-
ded into each IP core. The results are shown in Tab. 8. The 
data of S for each IP core benchmark gets form Map report. 
The column ‘n’ indicates the length of the watermark. The 
results show that the proposed watermark scheme has suffi-
ciently and convincingly low Pc. So our watermarking 
scheme for IP cores has a strong proof of authorship. For 
instance, design ‘des_perf’ with 2048-bit watermark exhib-
its the lowest Pc of 3.09×10-617. 
 
IP Core S N=4*S M n Pc 
aes_core 264 1056 12 256 4.78e-114 
vga_lcd 468 1872 8 256 5.81e-104 
pci_bridge32 920 3680 16 512 6.81e-212 
ethernet 1201 4804 64 1024 5.56e-309 
des_perf 2699 10796 64 2048 3.09e-617 
Tab. 8. The watermarking evaluation for Pc. 
3.3 Comparison of Experimental Results 
We compare our method with recent methods [17]. 
Tab. 9 reveals that the literature [17] has -1.28%~52.57% 
resource overhead and 6.98%~78.76% timing overhead, the 
overheads are large. The resource overhead not only has 
positive value but also has negative value, with uncertainty 
behavior. The non-linear behavior might be due to heuristic 
optimization algorithms and random [17]. It is attractive 
that our watermarking approach has zero resources and 
timing overhead. 
 
320 W.M 640 W.M 1280 W.M 2560 W.M 3840 W.M Core Watermarking Method %resources %time %resources %time %resources %time %resources %time %resources %time 
Literature[17] 4.97 39.19 9.39 9.39 17.98 64.05 35.23 77.81 52.57 78.76 Cordic Ours 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Literature[17] -1.28 10.34 0.28 6.98 0.48 24.175 -0.17 18.708 -3.83 29.786 DES56 Ours 0 0 0 0 3.030 0 0 0 0 0 
Literature[17] -0.74 10.11 2.78 55.42 1.91 57.20 9.07 29.93 9.75 44.37 RSA Ours 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tab. 9.  Overhead comparison with method [17]. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel watermarking 
technique to protect FPGA-based IP cores. The main fea-
tures of this technique are that, unlike existing techniques, 
it incurs zero-overhead and is robust against removing 
attacks. Also it has no effect on the function and perform-
ance of design. We achieve this solution by using CCM to 
group the watermark and then embedding marks into the 
ILUTs. Additionally, the proposed watermark scheme has 
convincingly low Pc which means that watermarked IP 
cores have a strong proof of authorship. 
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